


The Ethereum Consensus Network has a Privacy Issue

Lucianna Kiffer

Research Assistant Professor • IMDEA Networks Institute



Lioba Heimbach
ETH Zurich




Yann Vonlathen
ETH Zurich




Juan Villacis
University of Bern




Prof. Roger Wattenhofer
ETH Zurich











- Entities **in charge of consensus**
- Have unique Validator ID (per 32 ETH)

































Do we give up privacy as a tradeoff for lower network load?















Why does anonymity matter?





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

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

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
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

Why does anonymity matter?



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Why does anonymity matter?




Implications of de-anonymizing validators:

De-anonymization Methodology



I am in
all subnets!

?



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

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

I am in all subnets!





I am in all subnets!



I am in
all subnets!



subnet 13



subnet 61







93

subnet 57

93



subnet 7





subnet 14





subnet 13


subnet 14






























Measurement Methodology


Methodology

- Create a logging client:
RAINBOW





Methodology

- Create a logging client: RAINBOW
- Collect data on multiple locations for 3 days in May 2024




Methodology

- Create a logging client: RAINBOW
- Collect data on multiple locations for 3 days in May 2024
- Run a heuristic approach to deanonymization



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


peers			
	seen	with established connections	with long connections
FR	7,656	6,975	1,017
SO	7,816	7,122	1,142
VA	10,213	9,821	2,207
ZH	9,578	7,784	1,942
overall	11,219	10,785	4,372

Results

Results

Zurich, bare-bones, 1942 long connections



154'591

validators were deanonymized.


16%

of all validators were deanonymized.

Verification


Verification

- **Consistency** of validators
 - Same staking pool
 - Same deposit address
 - Same fee recipient address
 - Consecutive IDs




Verification

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- **Uniqueness** of Validator-IP Mapping



Verification


- **Consistency** of validators
 - Same staking pool
 - Same deposit address
 - Same fee recipient address
 - Consecutive IDs
- **Uniqueness** of Validator-IP Mapping
- **Similarity** of De-anonymizations




Take-aways

Validators per Peer

Overall




Five Largest Staking Pools




Location

Peers




Validators




Organizations

Peers



Validators



Summary

- RAINBOW implementation to show the feasibility of de-anonymizing Ethereum validators
 - low-cost, high-accuracy


Summary

- RAINBOW implementation to show the feasibility of de-anonymizing Ethereum validators
 - low-cost, high-accuracy
- Mitigations come at more cost, complexity, and/or latency
 - run more subnets, more nodes, more cryptography
 - increase anonymity set with friends
 - anonymous gossiping

Summary

- RAINBOW implementation to show the feasibility of de-anonymizing Ethereum validators
 - low-cost, high-accuracy
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 - run more subnets, more nodes, more cryptography
 - increase anonymity set with friends
 - anonymous gossiping
- Reported attack to Ethereum Foundation + a grant for followup work on the gossip protocol

Thanks!



paper